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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Austin, Patrick Facility: Great Meadow CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 90-A-9824 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
07-034-18 B 
Appearances: Andre Sedlak 
11 Market Street 
Suite 205 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601 
Decision appealed: June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12-
.months. 
Board Member(s) Drake, Cruse 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived December 5, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
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Commissioner 
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crissi 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate ,fipding. ~of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, oncfJ
1
V7j,l'/ {;6 . 
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    Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 12-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues in a lengthy and repetitive brief: 1) the 
decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board 
failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. The Board ignored his 
institutional record and only looked at the instant offenses. 2) the Board failed to make required 
findings of fact or to provide any detail. 3) the decision lacks future guidance. 4) the decision 
illegally resentenced him. 5) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 6) no 
aggravating factors exist. 7) the prison term for all but one of the instant offenses have expired. 8) 
the Board failed to review his sentencing minutes. 9) the Board ignored his youth at the time of 
the crime, per the Hawkins decision. 10) the decision was due to a political policy of the Governor 
to deny parole release to all violent felons. 11)  by having only two Commissioners, bias was 
present. 12) information was not properly furnished to his attorney on appeal, in violation of the 
right to counsel and 6th amendment confrontation clauses of the constitution. 13) the Board failed 
to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no TAP was done, the 
COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now present/future focused. And the COMPAS has an 
error on it. 14) the 12 month hold is excessive. 
  
         Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007).   
 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Austin, Patrick DIN: 90-A-9824  
Facility: Great Meadow CF AC No.:  07-034-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 2 of 7) 
 
    Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018);      
Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 
N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
    The Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole.  
See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012).   
     Appellant had some negative COMPAS scores. The Board may consider negative aspects of the 
COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) 
lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
    The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
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v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty 
interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008). 
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     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).  
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
      In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
     That the term for one of the instant offenses has expired does not mean he has completed that 
sentence. Per Penal Law 70.30(1)(a) all maximums of concurrent multiple indeterminate sentences 
merge and are satisfied by the discharge of the term which has the longest unexpired term to run. 
People v Buss, 11 N.Y.3d 553; Lynch v Smith, 123 A.D.3d 1279, 999 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dept. 
2014). Per Penal Law §70.30(1)(b), the minimum and maximum sentences of the two 
indeterminate consecutive sentences are added to form aggregate minimum and aggregate 
maximum wholes.  Thus, per Executive Law S259-i(3)(d)(iii), an inmate’s eligibility for parole 
release and appearance before the Board are governed by  the legal requirements of the new 
indeterminate sentence. Santiago v Alexander, 80 A.D.3d 1105, 916 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dept. 
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2011). Per Penal Law 70.30(1), concurrent sentences and consecutive sentences yield single 
sentences, either by merger when concurrent, or by addition when consecutive, and they then 
aggregate into a single sentence. People v Brinson, 90 A.D.3d 670, 933 N.Y.S.2d 728 (3d Dept. 
2011), Charles v New York State Department of Correctional Services, 96 A.D.3d 1341, 948 
N.Y.S.2d 172 (3d  Dept. 2012); Baez v Superintendent Queesnboro Correctional Facility, 127 
A.D.3d 110, 5 N.Y.S.3d 216 (2d Dept. 2015). Thus, NYSDOCCS aggregates the sentences into a 
single, combined sentence, and the inmate is not sequentially completing his punishment for each 
particular conviction. People v Almestica, 97 A.D.3d 834, 949 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dept. 2012). Per 
Penal law 70.30(1)(b), the inmate is subject to all the sentences that make up the merged or 
aggregate sentence he is serving, and the Parole Board may consider the facts of those crimes for 
those sentences that would have otherwise expired if not for the merger. Dawes v Annucci, 122 
A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     Appellant  was over the age of 18 when he committed this crime. Contrary to Appellant’s claim, 
Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016) – which requires consideration of youth and its attendant 
characteristics for inmates serving a maximum life sentence for crimes committed as juveniles – 
does not apply whereas here the inmate was an adult when he committed the instant offense.  
Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017) (Hawkins 
inapplicable to offender who was over 18 at time of offense); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 
S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (distinguishing juveniles under 18 from adults).   
     There is no merit to the claim the Board failed to consider the sentencing minutes, as they are 
included in the record, and the Board mentioned them during the interview. Shark v New York State 
Division of Parole Chair, 110 A.D.3d 1134, 972 N.Y.S.2d 741 (3d Dept. 2013). 
    Per the cited regulation, only two Commissioners are required to conduct the Board interview. 
There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).  There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision 
flowed from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d 
Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No evidence of any 
bias exists. 
     There is no merit to the claim that the Board decision was predetermined based on an alleged 
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executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders.  Allegations that the Board has 
systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed 
repeatedly by the Courts.  See, e.g., Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 
735 (3d Dept.  2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept. 
2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); 
Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 
703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th 
Dept.), appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004); Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 
301 A.D.2d 827, 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (3d  Dept. 2003), lv. denied, 99 N.Y.2d 511, 760 
N.Y.S.2d 102 (2003).      
 
     The Parole Board Report complies with the statute. And as for the constitutional claims raised,     
parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 
71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).   
         Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).  The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, 
as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that 
would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) 
cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.  
     The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to “Offender Case Plan.”  The 
existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(b). And a Case Plan was utilized. 
     The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime.  
Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866  (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 
N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 
1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 
1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate’s 
crimes, the  criminal history, the  prison disciplinary record, the  program accomplishments and post 
release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York 
State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     Notably, the 2011 amendment did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole, namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable 
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probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the 
law”; (2) whether release “is not incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release 
“will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Here, the Board relied on the second and third standards in denying release.  
Even uniformly low COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the 
broader questions of society’s welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether 
release would undermine respect for the law.  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular 
result, and declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The 
COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors 
for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. 
State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of 
Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     Appellant never raised an alleged COMPAS error at the interview, thereby waiving the issue. 
Matter of Shaffer v. Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie v New 
York State Division of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). If the inmate was given a 
chance to discuss the matter at the interview and didn’t mention it, the issue is without merit. Matter 
of Mercer v New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Index # 5872-
13, Decision/Order/Judgment dated April 7, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.)(Ceresia J.S.C.); Matter of 
Cox v Stanford, Index # 228-14, Decision and Order dated June 17, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
Co.)(McGrath J.S.C.).   If the inmate fails to raise the issue of alleged COMPAS error at the interview, 
and the matter could have been corrected then, the issue is waived. Matter of Cox v Stanford, Index 
# 228-14, Decision and Order dated April 18, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.)(McGrath J.S.C.).   
    In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   
Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 
2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester Co. 2006). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
